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Attempts to derive the Born rule, either in the Many Worlds or Copenhagen interpretation, are
unsatisfactory for systems with only a finite number of degrees of freedom. In the case of Many
Worlds this is a serious problem, since its goal is to account for apparent collapse phenomena,
including the Born rule for probabilities, assuming only unitary evolution of the wavefunction. For
finite number of degrees of freedom, observers on the vast majority of branches would not deduce
the Born rule. However, discreteness of the quantum state space, even if extremely tiny, may restore
the validity of the usual arguments.
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM WITH
PROBABILITY
Quantum mechanics exhibits an odd dichotomy in the
time evolution of states. A quantum state undergoes de-
terministic, unitary evolution until a measurement causes
probabilistic, non-unitary collapse. While many physi-
cists do not feel that there is anything wrong with this
standard Copenhagen picture, it seems less than econom-
ical to postulate two fundamental processes—unitary
evolution and non-unitary measurement—if somehow
one could suffice. Everett [1] proposed that unitary time
evolution of a closed system is sufficient to account for the
appearance of measurement collapse to observers inside
the system (see also Hartle [2] and DeWitt and Graham
[3]), in what has now become known as the Many Worlds
(MW) formulation of quantum mechanics.
The MW interpretation is regarded as extravagant,
and hence implausible, by many (including at least one of
the authors), because of the huge multiplicity of branches
of the wavefunction, each of which is presumed to be as
real as the others [5]. Before the anti-MW reader aban-
dons this paper, we note that the discussion that follows
applies also to the conventional Copenhagen interpreta-
tion, with measurement collapse, and may allow a deriva-
tion of probability in quantum mechanics from a weaker
initial assumption, known as the certainty assumption,
along the lines of Hartle [2] (see also Farhi, Goldstone
and Gutmann [6] and Coleman and Lesniewski [7]). An
attractive doctrine (preferred by one of the authors) is
the minimalist view outlined by Hartle [4] insisting that
physics should be done without ill-defined words and slo-
gans such as “The other worlds are just as real.” Our
analysis could also be read within this post-Everett or
decoherent histories approach.
We focus on the Born rule in quantum mechanics, and
the extent to which it can be derived. The Born rule
states that given an observable A with spectrum λi and
eigenstates |ψi〉, the probability of λi as the outcome of
a measurement on state |ψ〉 is Pi = |〈ψi|ψ〉|2. It has
been claimed by Everett, Hartle, and others, that this
rule arises as a consequence of the assumption of uni-
tary evolution, but as we discuss below, the derivation is
unsatisfactory for any system with only a finite number
of degrees of freedom. (For recent discussions of the Born
rule in MW, see [8].)
In a recent paper [9] we speculated that quantum grav-
ity and related considerations may imply that quantum
state space is itself discrete. We will review our argu-
ment in the next section. Here we point out that one
consequence of this discreteness in state space may be
the emergence of the Born rule, even in the case when
the number of degrees of freedom is finite.
The original derivation of the Born rule given by Ev-
erett [1], Hartle [2], and others, is quite simple. Consider
an ensemble of identically prepared states
Ψ = ψ ⊗ · · · ⊗ ψ = ⊗Na=1 ψ(a), (1)
and a sequence of outcomes S = (s1, s2, . . . , sN ) ob-
tained from measurements on each of the states. The
probability P (S) of a given sequence, or class of se-
quences, calculated using the Born rule, is identical to
the norm (magnitude) squared of the projection of Ψ onto
eigenstates with the eigenvalues (s1, s2, . . . , sN), namely
|〈s1s2 . . . sN |Ψ〉|2. As Everett noted, it follows that an
improbable sequence corresponds to a component of Ψ
(in the eigenstate basis) with small magnitude. In the
formal limit N →∞, components of Ψ which do not cor-
respond to statistically typical sequences generated by
the Born rule have zero magnitude (i.e. converge to the
null vector), and therefore do not correspond to physical
states. From the frequentist perspective on probability,
then, the Born rule is a consequence of excluding zero
norm states from the Hilbert space.
To further elucidate, consider a simple example us-
ing spin states. Let |ψ〉 = c+|+〉 + c−|−〉, and define
p± = |c±|2. Then a sequence of measurement outcomes
will be of the form S = {+ + − + · · · }. If the sequence
is generated by the Born rule, then in the limit of large
N , the fraction of (+) outcomes will be p+ to very good
approximation. Any other value for the fraction of (+)
outcomes has zero probability at infinite N . Correspond-
ingly, the magnitude squared |〈s1s2 · · · sN |Ψ〉|2 is zero for
any state 〈s1s2 · · · sN | in which the fraction of outcomes
si equal to (+) is not p+.
2This can be generalized: if 〈s1s2 · · · sN | corresponds
to a sequence S = {s1, s2, . . . , sN} which is statistically
atypical according to the Born rule, its overlap with Ψ
will vanish when N → ∞. Everett referred to these
branches of the wavefunction as “maverick worlds”—
observers on these branches would not deduce the Born
rule. Below, we will repeat this discussion for those read-
ers who prefer a more standard Copenhagen interpreta-
tion to the MW interpretation.
We can define parameters characterizing the deviation
of a maverick world from the central Born value. For
example, in the spin example, we might consider f+ to
be the frequency of (+) outcomes, so that δ = f+−p+ is
the deviation parameter. Then any branch with non-zero
δ will have vanishing norm in the large N limit. When
N is strictly infinite all maverick worlds have zero norm.
The remaining branches have outcomes S which satisfy
the Born rule in the frequentist sense.
The problem with this reasoning is of course that N
is never strictly infinite. In fact, given the finite size of
the causal horizon of our universe and an ultraviolet cut-
off on modes (e.g., from the Planck scale), we obtain a
finite, although very large, upper limit on the number
of outcomes N which characterize any particular branch
of the MW wavefunction. Without invoking something
like the Born rule—a correspondence between probability
and norm—there is no reason to exclude branches with
small but non-zero norm. The problem is exacerbated
by the fact that maverick worlds are generally far more
numerous than non-maverick worlds. The MWwavefunc-
tion branches with each measurement, regardless of how
small either of |c±|2 is. This leads to 2N total branches
after N measurements. Even if, e.g., |c+|2 is much larger
than |c−|2, both (+) and (−) outcomes will still occur at
each branch, and the structure of the tree is independent
of c± as long as neither is zero. The overwhelming major-
ity of branches will have roughly equal numbers of (+)
and (−) outcomes. Thus the multiplicity of maverick
worlds is enormously larger than non-maverick worlds,
although their collective magnitude is vanishingly small.
Again, without assuming the Born rule, we have no a` pri-
ori reason to exclude small (but non-zero) norm states.
Of course, a strict frequentist interpretation of prob-
ability requires an infinite sequence of outcomes. How-
ever, the use of probability by physicists is more Bayesian
than frequentist: confronted with a finite sequence of
outcomes, S = (s1, s2, . . . , sN ), our goal is to deduce a
predictive model for subsequent outcomes. In this way,
we deduce the Born rule based on the limited number of
measurements thus far performed on quantum systems.
As mentioned, our discussion may be of interest even to
those who do not accept MW, as it pertains to the origin
of the Born rule within the Copenhagen, or measurement
collapse, interpretation. In particular, it has been pro-
posed by Hartle [2] that the Born rule can be derived
from the weaker certainty assumption, stating that when
a measurement of an observable A is performed on an
eigenstate |a〉 of A, the value a is obtained with certainty.
Taking A to be, for example, the frequency operator for
(+) outcomes, or any other statistical property, Hartle
found that for N infinite, Ψ is an eigenstate of each of
these statistical operators, with eigenvalues given by the
Born rule.
The discussion parallels that in the MW interpretation.
In the standard Copenhagen picture the state Ψ is, in
the eigenstate basis, a sum of 2N terms, each term being
in one-to-one correspondence with a MW branch or a
universe. In the Copenhagen interpretation the outcomes
S result from measurements on an ensemble, whereas
in MW they specify a particular branch or decoherent
history [10] of the wavefunction of the entire universe.
The mathematics is the same in either picture: maverick
terms collectively have a very small norm that approaches
zero as N approaches infinity.
This has the same weakness as the earlier MW argu-
ment. For any finite N , the state Ψ is only approximately
an eigenstate of the frequency operator. The certainty
assumption does not specify the outcome of a measure-
ment on an approximate eigenstate, and going further
requires an assumption relating the norm of a state vec-
tor to the probability of a measurement outcome, which
is essentially the Born rule.
DISCRETE STATE SPACE
Consider normalized states Ψ = ψ ⊗ · · · ⊗ ψ and
Ψ ′ = ψ′ ⊗ · · · ⊗ ψ′. Suppose that, due to fundamen-
tal discreteness, one cannot distinguish ψ and ψ′ when
|ψ− ψ′| < ǫ. This implies that the direct product states
cannot be distinguished when (assuming
√
Nǫ≪ 1)
|Ψ − Ψ ′| <
√
Nǫ. (2)
(We have assumed that 〈ψ|ψ′〉 is real, which would be the
case if ψ′ resulted from rotating ψ slightly on the Bloch
sphere. Relative phases could lead to order Nǫ terms
in Eq. (2), which allow an acceptable cutoff of maverick
branches for even smaller discreteness scale ǫ.) Moti-
vated by this observation, we assume that any (maver-
ick!) components of Ψ with norm less than
√
Nǫ can be
removed from the wavefunction.
We argued in Ref. [9] that quantum gravity suggests a
discreteness scale of order ǫ ∼ E, where E is the charac-
teristic energy of the system described by ψ, in Planck
units. Equivalently, ǫ ∼ L−1, where L is the character-
istic size, or Compton wavelength, of the system. We
can motivate this result by noting that quantum grav-
ity seems to imply a minimal length [11] of order the
Planck length. A minimal length restricts our ability to
distinguish two different orientations of an experimental
apparatus, such as a Stern-Gerlach device for measuring
3the orientation of a spin. (Rotation of the device by an
angle less than L−1 does not displace any component by
more than the Planck length.) Thus, the resulting ambi-
guity in the spin state even after an ideal measurement
is at least of order ǫ given above (see Fig. 1). There is no
way to ensure that the ensemble states ψ are identical to
accuracy better than ǫ. For example, each time we pass
a spin through the Stern-Gerlach device to produce an-
other ψ there can be no guarantee that the Stern-Gerlach
device remains in precisely the same orientation.
While some might consider fundamental discreteness
of the space of quantum states (previously referred to in
the earlier paper [9] as discrete Hilbert space [12]) to be
a radical notion, we find asserting its absolute continuity
in the absence of any supporting experimental evidence
to be perhaps just as speculative. Consider the case of
spacetime: few would claim that spacetime must be ab-
solutely continuous (in fact, most likely it is not [11]);
why should quantum state space be different?
It is worth emphasizing that the discreteness we pro-
pose has nothing to do with the dimensionality of state
space. Rather, it has to do with whether the coefficients
ci in an eigenstate expansion |ψ〉 =
∑
i ci|i〉 are contin-
uous or can only take on a discrete set of values (see
Fig. 1).
We have not specified the concrete realization of dis-
creteness, other than to assume that states can be defined
only modulo some fundamental uncertainty. There are
many ways to define the evolution of a state in a discrete
state space. One method would be to write the time evo-
lution operator e−iHt as a product of discrete evolution
operators e−iH∆t and apply this product of operators se-
quentially to the state, followed by the “snap to” rule
(“snap to nearest lattice site”; see Fig. 1) after each step.
This is equivalent to taking classical digital computer
simulations literally. That is, by accepting the finite pre-
cision of the variable ψ(x) in an ordinary computer pro-
gram, one obtains a naive discretization of Hilbert space
with the “snap to” rule implemented by simple numeri-
cal rounding. With limited numerical precision, branches
of the wavefunction with very small norm are eventually
discarded. This scheme leads to small violations of linear
superposition, but only at the level of ǫ.
Interestingly, for ǫ ∼ L−1, the condition that discrete-
ness have only a small effect on Ψ ,
√
Nǫ≪ 1, leads to a
condition on the number of degrees of freedom reminis-
cent of holography [13]:
N ≪ L2 ∼ A, (3)
where A is the surface area of the region. This bound
implies far fewer degrees of freedom than the usual exten-
sive scaling N ∼ L3. It can be deduced as a constraint
from gravitational collapse [14]. Excluding states from
the Hilbert space of the L3 volume which would have al-
ready caused gravitational collapse to a black hole, we
find the stronger condition N < A3/4 ∼ L3/2.
FIG. 1: A possible discretization of the Bloch sphere (qubit
state space). Points on each disc (of size ǫ) are identified.
Points between discs can be assigned to the nearest disc.
NO MAVERICK WORLDS
Consider the spin example from the first section. Let
n = n+ = f+N be the number of (+) outcomes in the
sequence S. We suppress the + subscript in what follows.
For N ≫ 1, the function
P (n) =
(
N
n
)
pn(1− p)N−n. (4)
has a sharp maximum at n = pN and rapidly decreases
for n sufficiently far from it. The maximum results from
a competition between the combinatorial factor (multi-
plicity), which is peaked at n = N/2, and the product
pn(1− p)N−n, which is peaked at either n = 0 or n = N ,
unless p− is extremely close to p+. It follows that when
calculating P (n) for n not too far from pN , we make a
negligible error by assuming n≫ 1 and N − n≫ 1. The
Stirling formula gives
P (fN) ≈ [2πNf(1− f)]−1/2 exp [−Nφ(f)] , (5)
where
φ(f) = f ln (f/p) + (1− f) ln [(1− f)/(1− p)] (6)
and f = n/N . For large N this becomes sharply peaked.
Expanding φ(f) around f = p, we find
P (fN) ≈ [2πNp(1− p)]−1/2 exp
[
−N(f − p)
2
2p(1− p)
]
. (7)
The collective magnitude squared of all maverick states
|δ,N〉 with frequency deviation |δ| = |f − p| greater than
δ0 is
∑
|δ|>δ0
〈δ,N |δ,N〉 ≈ 2N
∫ ∞
p+δ0
df P (fN) . (8)
One contribution to the sum comes from the range f ∈
[0, p − δ0] and the other from the range f ∈ [p + δ0, 1].
Note that we have replaced f(1− f) in the overall factor
4in P (fN) by p(1 − p). The resulting error should be
negligible for our purposes here.
Requiring that this collective magnitude squared is less
than Nǫ2 yields
δ0 > N
−1/2
[
2p(1− p)| ln(Nǫ2)|]1/2 . (9)
The maximum deviation δ for undiscarded branches van-
ishes as N →∞ for fixed p, ǫ. If, for finite N , an exper-
imenter could measure all N outcomes which define his
branch of the wavefunction, he might find a deviation
from the predicted Born frequency f = p as large as
| ln(Nǫ2)|1/2 standard deviations (i.e., measuring the de-
viation in units of N−1/2). Note that we are working in
the regime Nǫ2 ≪ 1. If the discussion in Ref. [9] offers
a valid guide, the number ǫ may be much smaller than
10−20, so that even if N is as large as Avogadro’s number,
Nǫ2 will still be a small number (see example below).
However, an experimenter is unlikely to be able to mea-
sure more than a small fraction of the outcomes that
determine his branch. Recall that in MW a particular
branch of the wavefunction is specified by the sequence
of outcomes S = (s1, s2, . . . , sN ). N is the total num-
ber of decoherent outcomes on a branch, so it is typically
enormous—at least Avogadro’s number if the system con-
tains macroscopic objects such as an experimenter. The
experimental outcomes available to test Born’s rule will
be a much smaller number N∗ ≪ N corresponding to a
subset of the si directly related to the experiment. Any
deviation from the Born rule of order N−1/2 will be well
within the experimental statistical error of order N
−1/2
∗ .
Therefore the Born rule will be observed to hold in all the
branches which remain after truncation due to discrete-
ness. This would, however, not be true if we were to set
ǫ to zero, in which case | ln(Nǫ2)|1/2 would be infinite.
For definiteness, consider the following numerical ex-
ample. Let the discreteness scale be truly tiny: ǫ ∼
10−100, and let N ∼ 10160, which is the Hubble four-
volume in fermis. Then | ln(Nǫ2)|1/2 ∼ 10, so unless
experimenters can measure more than 10−2N ∼ 10158
quantum outcomes, they will have insufficient statistics
to exclude any of the maverick branches which remain
after truncation.
COPENHAGEN AGAIN
If we assume the Copenhagen (collapse) interpretation,
our analysis describes when the Born rule can be sup-
planted by the weaker assumption of certainty of mea-
surement outcome when the measured state is an eigen-
state. In a discrete Hilbert space it is natural to ex-
tend the notion of eigenstate, so that states within the
discreteness distance ǫ of an eigenstate will also be con-
sidered eigenstates. (More precisely, we cannot distin-
guish between any two such states.) As discussed in the
previous section, for large (but finite) N , Ψ is approxi-
mately an eigenstate of any statistical operator (such as
the frequency operator, but also higher moments) with
eigenvalue equal to the Born rule value. For example,
the wavefunction is sharply peaked at the Born rule fre-
quency value of f = p. If, motivated by the discreteness
scale ǫ, we simply modify the certainty assumption to in-
clude states which are approximate eigenstates, we will
have deduced the Born rule from a more elementary as-
sumption.
There is, however, a technical difficulty in defining how
close a state Ψ is to being an eigenstate of an operator
such as the frequency operator. It would be natural to
impose a certainty criteria as follows. Given Ψ satisfying
|Ψ − Ψf | <
√
Nǫ , (10)
where Ψf is an eigenstate of the frequency operator with
eigenvalue f , we identify Ψ with Ψf and require that a
measurement of the frequency on Ψ return the value f
with certainty. The problem arises because, for finite
N , no choice of Ψ = ⊗Na=1ψ(a) is an exact eigenstate of
the frequency operator (except in the trivial cases where
ψ is already an eigenstate such as |+〉 or |−〉, and in
those cases f is either zero or one). The state Ψf does
not exist, except in the limit N → ∞, so the distance
criteria in Eq. (10) cannot be defined. (Ψ and Ψf live in
Hilbert spaces of very different dimensions.) One has to
rely on some other criterion for identifying a state Ψ as
a frequency eigenstate.
One possibility is to use the width of |Ψ |2 about the
maximum, in comparison to some ǫ-dependent quan-
tity. When the width is sufficiently small, the cer-
tainty assumption is assumed to apply. Consider a self-
adjoint operator A, its eigenvectors ψi and eigenvalues
λi, Aψi = λiψi, 〈ψi|ψj〉 = δij (i, j = 1, . . . , n). (For
the qubit case A is the spin operator and n = 2.) For
a state ψ =
∑n
i=1 ciψi, projection operators Pi satisfy
Piψ = ciψi. This gives 〈ψ|Pi|ψ〉 = |ci|2 = pi and∑n
i=1 pi = 1. Let us consider the state of N copies of ψ,
Ψ = ⊗Na=1ψ(a). The frequency operators for the eigenval-
ues λi are
Fi = N
−1
n∑
j1,...,jN=1
N∑
a=1
δija ⊗Nb=1 Pjb . (11)
We find
〈Ψ |Fi|Ψ〉 = pi, (12)
〈Ψ |F 2i |Ψ〉 = N−1pi +N−1(N − 1)p2i , (13)
and the variances are (∆Fi)
2 = N−1pi(1− pi).
Consider ψ′ =
∑n
i=1 c
′
iψi close to ψ, and require
(pi − p′i)2 < min{(∆Fi)2, (∆F ′i )2}. (14)
5This gives
|ci − c′i|2 < N−1(1− pi), (15)
which leads to
|ψ − ψ′|2 < N−1(n− 1). (16)
This condition is satisfied if we require |ψ − ψ′|2 ≪ ǫ2,
recalling that Nǫ2 < 1. It is natural to identify the two
states ψ and ψ′, and consider them both approximate
eigenstates of the frequency operator.
CONCLUSIONS
We argued that attempts to derive the Born rule, either
in the Many Worlds or Copenhagen interpretation, are
unsatisfactory for systems with only a finite number of
degrees of freedom. For Many Worlds this is a serious
problem, since its goal is to account for apparent collapse
phenomena—including the Born rule for probabilities—
assuming only unitary evolution of the wavefunction. For
finite number of degrees of freedom, observers on the vast
majority of branches would not deduce the Born rule.
However, we noted that discreteness of the quantum
state space, even if extremely tiny, may restore the valid-
ity of the usual arguments. Some may regard discreteness
as a radical proposal. We might argue that it is actually
less speculative than absolute continuity, something that
can never be experimentally verified.
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